South Africa's Quiet Diplomacy In The Zimbabwean Crisis: An Analysis More Than Two Decades Later

"Sometimes we think that today will forever be today, not remembering that today will be tomorrow and tomorrow will be different" These are the beautiful words of President Thabo Mbeki that I want each of us to carry and remember when faced with gloomy days. I thought it would be befitting that my first piece for the year should look at some of the work of one of Africa's best minds.  

This piece intends to serve as an analysis of the Zimbabwean crisis in the early 2000s, the South African government's policy towards the matter under the leadership of President Mbeki, if there were alternatives available and if they should have been explored.

I would be doing a huge disservice both to myself and to you if I did not start off by loosely defining what foreign policy is and its importance; so we can look at foreign policy as a set of guidelines that a state (or national government, I'm using the terms interchangeably here) uses to guide its relations and interactions with other states. 

The one thing we ought to always keep in mind is that each and every state will draft, implement and promote foreign policies that protect and promote their interests, that is the raison d'etre: for every party involved to ensure that what is in their best interest is known, respected and adhered to. There is no state that will advocate for a policy that is to the detriment of its citizenry or interests because states, first and foremost, owe allegiance to their citizens. 

You've probably wondered why South Africa leads when it comes to countries that are always abstaining in United Nations (UN) matters, that's largely influenced by the fact that we have good relations with almost all countries which has the potential to put us in awkward positions when it comes to certain matters because you don't want to 'anger' state A and at the same time you do not want to take a stand that might seem like an endorsement of certain 'unbecoming' conduct and possibly compromise good relations with state B.

This has often led to flip-flopping or fence-sitting, it can even be argued that our stances are lukewarm because we're trying to maintain good relationships with as many state parties as possible because of moral obligation and obviously the benefits that are attached to this, it does work to our advantage although what's that saying about a friend to all? 

I will not go into detail about the origins nor current state of the Zimbabwean crisis for fear of this piece being impossibly long, I do not want to risk losing your attention halfway through and most importantly I am choosing to trust that you are not unfamiliar with, inter alia, the terrible state of the economy that has led to mass migration, political instability, loss of life that is politically associated, the non-existence of the rule of law, lack of good governance, sheer thuggery as well as the overall blatant human rights violations happening beyond our northern borders so I'll just dive right in. 

There was a huge divide in the country regarding the handling of the Zimbabwean crisis, in fact there were differences even within the ANC itself on how the matter should be approached: the party moved a motion in the National Assembly that 'violence and intimidation had severely compromised the possibility of a free and fair [Zimbabwean] parliamentary election in June 2000' despite some election observers including President Mbeki having sworn that the elections were free and fair. 

I think this is where I give a disclaimer (?) that I have been religiously following President Mbeki since the first time I came to know of his existence from my father's small radio that he always ensured blasted louder than the voices of his customers in his spaza shop. This little piece of information has more to do with my own father than the President, let us be kind enough to excuse my nostalgia. 

Anyway this is where the President's 'quiet diplomacy' comes in, by the way I am personally not too confident that anything contrary to this would still constitute as diplomacy (I am aware there are stages to and various options available in the foreign affairs stage when bargaining for your interests i.e. negotiations, sanctions, threats but I still stand by my stance). 

One of the reasons Mbeki gave for this 'soft' approach is that it is the people of Zimbabwe that ought to determine their own future and not a matter of another state coming in and imposing its own values onto the country because ultimately Zimbabwe is a sovereign state and its sovereignty ought to be respected and maintained always.

In any case, President Mbeki called for, encouraged and even participated in talks between the ZANU-PF government and the opposition, MDC on trying to establish common ground for the benefit of the citizens. Getting these parties to reach actionable common ground later proved to be Mission Impossible: Africa Edition because 10 steps would be taken backwards whenever there seemed to be a near breakthrough of some sort. 

The confusion and division on how Zimbabwe ought to be approached was not only in government, Civil Society Organizations, religious leaders, the media, the business sector and the general public all had different inputs and unfortunately no real contribution to the drafting of the country's foreign policy. 

This is expected in an environment where all these parties are expecting different outcomes out of the situation; civil society and religious leaders shared a voice against human rights abuses whilst business was more concerned about the effects this would have on the sector (not to say human rights violations aren't of concern but their primary concern is always profit even if this can be disguised behind a voice of concern against gross human rights violations). 

I will not touch much on the DA's 2003 proposed alternate 5 stage policy to the crisis which included the voluntary departure of President Mugabe from office (a very ambitious and impossible task, we've come to learn). I believe that is the one true beauty that only those in the opposition enjoy: putting pressure on the (ruling) government to enforce policies they themselves would not (be able to) implement had they been in power. 

In the rare event that the government heeds that call, they get to enjoy front row spectation of the (inevitable) failure and it somehow works in their favour because they can then chant "we would not put the people of South Africa" through such. 

Some have argued with rigorousness that the DA together with members of the minority were not foaming at the mouth for the human rights of the majority in Zimbabwe but rather this was about protecting the interests of certain groups of society claiming the common understanding was that "if government can allow this (seizing of farms) to happen in Zimbabwe, a domino effect will be sparked and South Africa will soon follow suit".

Perhaps President Mbeki was well aware of this concern hence his remarks to the South African Chamber of Business (SACOB, now South African Chamber of Commerce) in 2000 wherein he ruled out land grabs in South Africa stating “It is quite obvious that we cannot allow a situation where we have that kind of conflict here. It will not happen here." 

In conclusion, I will say that President Mbeki was too occupied with being his brother's keeper (Mugabe), he forgot about the Zimbabwean nation in its entirety. By the way, I find it ironic that I have been labeled a staunch Mbekist and yet the man is known to abhor idolism. Happy New Year to you!